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Abstract 
People may assume that immoral act severity and judgments of character have a one-to-one, 
linear relationship; that is, as people’s perception of the severity of an immoral act increases, 
character judgments about the person performing the act become equally worse. However, 
evidence suggests that character judgments might be more categorical or discrete. We examine 
the relationship between act severity and character judgments in 3 studies—one correlational 
study, in which participants rated act severity and character for 19 different immoral act 
scenarios; one experimental study, in which participants rated act severity and character for act 
scenarios with 5 levels of severity; and a final experimental study, in which participants 
predicted an individual’s future actions, across different severity levels, based on that 
individual’s past action. Results suggest that character judgments are overall more discrete than 
judgments of act severity; in particular, we find evidence suggesting that evil is a distinct 
category of character. These findings improve our understanding of moral impression formation 
and suggest that judgments of blame, punishment, and likelihood of recidivism may vary 
depending on whether act or character is emphasized. 
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  The good, the bad, and the evil: The nonlinear relation between act and character judgments 
Making judgments of moral character is essential for navigating every day social 
situations. Consider interactions with your neighbors: if you judge them to have good moral 
character, you might give them a copy of your key and ask their teenager to babysit your 
children. If you judge them to have bad moral character, you might double-check your locks at 
night and refuse their dinner invitations. Moral character judgments help us make sense of the 
world; they help us identify a cause for significant behaviors and anticipate possible future 
behaviors, both of which are crucial for determining social behavior (Kelley, 1967). 
 The study of morality, both in philosophy and psychology, has largely focused on acts. 
For example, Kant’s deontological ethics focuses on the permissiveness of an act itself (e.g., 
lying and murder are always wrong, under all circumstances), while Mill’s consequentialist 
utilitarianism focuses on the morality of an act based on the consequences it brings about (e.g., 
killing one person is permissible if it saves a thousand others; Kant, 1964; Mill, 1962). 
Additionally, decades of psychology research have been conducted on what characteristics of an 
act result in its perception as moral or immoral. As early as the 1960s, researchers explored 
whether the legal status of an act affects how people judge its morality (Berkowitz & Walker, 
1967). More recently, psychologists developed models of moral judgment based on act 
characteristics such as harm, purity, fairness, and obedience (e.g., Graham et al., 2011; Gray, 
Young, & Waytz, 2012).  
 However, there is limited research on exactly how people judge the moral character of 
others, especially in relation to the acts they commit. Judgments of moral character are 
undoubtedly strongly related to judgments of acts, as behavior is the primary informant when we 
form impressions of others over long periods of time (Matheson, Holmes, & Kristiansen, 1991). 
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But little is known about the structure of moral character judgments, and how we arrive at these 
judgments by observing the actions of others. In the current study we examine one dimension of 
immoral actions—severity—and its relationship with the moral character judgments made about 
the person performing the immoral action.    
Importance of Moral Character Judgments 
 Humans judge others with remarkable speed and automaticity. We finish forming first 
impressions across several traits within the first 100 milliseconds of seeing someone’s face, and 
we often form these impressions automatically—that is, without consciously controlling our 
thoughts (Willis & Todorov, 2006; Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz 1996). Furthermore, these 
facial first impressions often reflect real traits in the person being evaluated; for example, people 
can identify a man’s sexual orientation with surprising accuracy within 50 milliseconds of seeing 
his face (Rule & Ambady, 2008). Even pre-verbal infants make these social evaluations, further 
supporting the innateness of the impression-formation process (Hamlin, Wynn, and Bloom, 
2007).  
 The seeming innateness and importance of character judgments makes sense in the 
context of human evolution: the ability to make quick and low-effort evaluations would have 
been so important to the survival of our ancestors that modern humans’ character-judging 
tendency may be a product of natural selection. This evolutionary perspective is supported by 
work showing that humans use logic more effectively in social exchange contexts, such as when 
they suspect others of cheating (Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). An early hominid 
would likely have had a better chance at surviving and reproducing if her cognitive processes 
allowed her to identify cheaters and other immoral individuals who could potentially harm her. 
Additionally, Miller (2007) suggests that good moral character may be a sexually selective 
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adaptation, since positive morality implies other positive traits related to genetics and parenting 
ability. 
 The importance of evaluating moral character extends beyond its reproductive benefit; 
recent research on moral character shows that judgments of morality powerfully influence 
perceptions of others (Goodwin, 2015). The content model proposes that two characteristics—
warmth and competence—are central to how we perceive groups and form stereotypes (Fiske, 
Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). According to this model, when people form social perceptions they 
evaluate the degree to which someone is warm (i.e. friendly, helpful, sincere, trustworthy) and 
competent (i.e. intelligent, skilled, creative; Cuddy, Fiske, Glick, 2008). These evaluations 
predict people’s subsequent attitude and behavior toward the person or group in question 
(Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). In these studies, moral character is viewed as a component or 
sub-category of warmth; however, recent moral psychology research suggests this 
conceptualization of morality understates its distinctiveness and importance in person perception 
(Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2013). For example, it is possible to envision a person who is 
unfriendly or disagreeable, yet still moral and trustworthy; this results in a more complex 
perception than simply “moderately warm.” Recent research indeed found that sociability and 
morality components of warmth each play distinct roles in impression formation (Brambilla, 
Rusconi, Sacci, & Cherubini, 2011; Brambilla, Sacci, Rusconi, Cherubini, & Yzerbyt, 2012). 
Additionally, one study explored moral character as its own dimension in person perception and 
not only found it to be separable from warmth, but also more central than warmth in forming 
impressions of others (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014).  
Unsurprisingly, impression formation often translates into behavior toward those groups 
and individuals. Positive reputations promote cooperation and mutual success for individuals 
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(Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg & Nowak, 2009), and perceptions of good moral character 
actually modify reward circuits, such that participants in a trust game were more likely to make 
risky choices after interacting with someone they perceived to have good moral character 
(Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005). This suggests that perceiving someone to be a morally good 
person is enough to increase trust and subsequent risk-taking behavior. Finally, moral character 
is more important than competence in forming emotional reactions to unfamiliar people; in a 
study conducted with schoolteachers, these emotional reactions predicted subsequent willingness 
to help a newcomer adjust socially and professionally (Pagliaro, Brambilla, Sacchi, D’Angelo, & 
Ellemers, 2013). It is clear that our perceptions of positive or negative moral character determine 
our behavior towards others.  
How people make moral character judgments  
 Judging the character of others is a frequent and essential part of the human social 
experience—but how are these character judgments formed? People form impressions and make 
moral character judgments through evaluations of facial appearance, emotion expressions, and 
behavior. Research has established that both adults and children attribute personality traits to 
people based solely on the appearance of their faces (Petrican, Todorov, & Grady, 2014; 
Cogsdill, Todorov, Spelke, & Banaji, 2014). Furthermore, people use faces to evaluate 
trustworthiness, suggesting that physical appearance may be one of the first cues used when 
developing moral character judgments (Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2007; Dailey, Cottrell, Padgett, 
& Adolphs, 2002; Todorov, Pakrashi, & Oosterhof, 2009). Additionally, emotion expressions 
cause generalization effects in which people assume personality traits from temporary displays of 
emotion; for example, one might characterize someone with an angry facial expression as 
generally hostile (Harker & Keltner, 2001). Furthermore, emotional displays moderate the effect 
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of behavior on impression formation, such that behavior-correspondent impressions are stronger 
when the behavior is performed with positive affect and weaker when the behavior is performed 
with negative affect (Ames & Johar, 2009).  
 While facial appearance and emotion expressions are often involved, the most central cue 
used in forming impressions and making judgments of character is the behavior itself. The field 
of moral psychology relies on the assumption that people evaluate behavior when making 
judgments of personality and moral character in others. While this is undoubtedly the case, the 
exact nature of this relationship is unclear. 
Relationship between Moral Acts and Moral Character 
 Though behavior is undoubtedly the key factor in character judgments, how behaviors are 
performed matters as well. Keeping outcome constant, faster moral or immoral decisions lead to 
stronger judgments of either good or bad character, respectively (Critcher, Inbar, & Pizarro, 
2013); actions are judged more harshly than omissions (DeScioli, Christner, & Kurzban, 2011); 
and direct contact is judged more strongly than indirect contact (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 
2006). The type of moral violation may also determine its influence on moral character; for 
example, purity violations appear to influence character judgments more than non-purity 
violations resulting in equal or lesser harm (Chakroff & Young, 2015). 
 However, there is some reason to believe that the “shape” or distribution of character 
judgments may be quite different from the distribution of action judgments, which seem to occur 
on a spectrum or continuum; on the other hand, where moral agents are concerned, people often 
appear to categorize individuals or groups, leading to more discrete judgments. For example, 
both current and historical religious beliefs have expressed a moral dualism in which two gods or 
spirits represent good and evil, respectively (e.g. Ancient Egyptian religion, Christianity, and 
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Zoroastrianism; Frankfort, 1948; 2 Thess. 3:3 New International Version; Clark, 1998). 
Additionally, many groups throughout history have shown ethical dualism, which refers to the 
identification of certain groups (typically outgroups) as fundamentally “evil” and other groups 
(typically ingroups) as free from or incapable of evil (Gammie, 1974). Examples of victims of 
this stark evil categorization include Jews, Muslims, and the bourgeoisie. Finally, in Roman 
Catholicism, sins are divided into mortal and venial sins, not because the actions within these 
two categories are equally harmful, but because mortal sins “wound” the soul and damage a 
person’s link with God, whereas venial sins do not (Ankerberg, Weldon, & Burroughs, 2009). 
Thus, while the harm caused by these actions may vary substantially, some are highly relevant to 
a person’s “character” in the eyes of God, whereas others are less relevant. In these instances, 
people place individuals, groups, and Gods into inflexible moral categories, rather than view the 
differences between them as complex or nuanced.  
 The apparent discreteness of moral character judgments extends to the American criminal 
justice system. In courts of law, the punishment a person receives for a given action varies 
greatly depending on the severity of the action and the surrounding context. However, this 
variation only matters in light of the most crucial judgment made in court: whether a person is 
Guilty or Not Guilty. Although an incredible number of specific violations are codified in law 
(for federal laws in the United States, this number exceeds 4,400), our judgments of those who 
stand trial ultimately reduce to whether or not we think they did it (and thus, presumably, 
whether or not we think they’re a bad person). Job and school applications ask whether people 
have committed any crimes or served jail time, categorizing people as criminals and non-
criminals; in many cases, any criminal record, regardless of specific actions and sentencing, can 
severely impede a person’s ability to apply for jobs and housing (The Sentencing Project, 2011). 
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 People seem to make categorical judgments about others’ character, and these judgments 
seem to have serious consequences for the people in question.  However, whether character 
judgments actually are more categorical or discrete than act judgments, and why they would be, 
is a tougher question. One basic reason for why actions might yield more diverse moral 
judgments is that the “universe” of immoral actions is, itself, more diverse.  
 If character judgments are indeed more categorical than act judgments, it is possible that 
people’s perceptions of moral character are simply binary: a person is either good or bad. 
However, a third category may exist to account for the worst possible actions. When you think 
about the kinds of actions that a “bad” person commits, you may not consider the very worst 
actions, such as rape, murder, and kidnapping. However, when you think about the kinds of 
actions that an “evil” person commits, you may suddenly suspect these severe actions. Briefly 
revisiting United States federal law shows that, of the over 4,400 possible violations, only 41 of 
them qualify a perpetrator for the death penalty, suggesting that these actions uniquely reflect on 
a person’s character, such that the person loses their right to life. 
Chakroff and Young (2015) explored how a person’s past actions affect people’s beliefs 
about the actions that person will commit in the future. They found that these beliefs about future 
actions are systematically influenced by impure and harmful past actions, such that past impure 
actions lead to predictions of both impure and harmful future actions, while past harmful actions 
only lead to predictions of future harmful actions. We suggest that the severity of people’s moral 
actions may similarly influence people’s expectations of future actions: those who have already 
raped and murdered (and are thus evil) are perceived as likely to recommit these exceptionally 
severe acts (in addition to less severe acts), while those who have merely committed petty theft 
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or mild violence are only perceived as likely to commit mild to moderately immoral acts in the 
future.  
 In the present research, we address three main questions with three studies. First, we test 
whether judgments of moral character are more discrete than judgments of moral acts, with 
respect to their “wrongness.” Second, we determine whether these discrete judgments divide 
people into either two categories (good or bad) or three categories (good, bad, or evil). Third, we 
determine whether these categories systematically influence people’s beliefs about future 
actions. 
Study 1 
In our first study, we selected immoral scenarios with a reasonable range in severity and 
domain and had participants rate both the severity of each act and the immorality of the person’s 
character in each act. Because we did not pilot act scenarios for severity, this study was 
correlational rather than experimental. Overall, we predicted that character ratings would be 
more discrete than act severity ratings, and that there would be a distinct “evil” character 
categorization. Specifically, we predicted that for mild immoral actions, character judgments 
would exceed act judgments (because committing any immoral act would automatically make 
someone a bad person); for moderately immoral acts, act and character ratings would be similar; 
for harsh immoral acts, act ratings would exceed character ratings (because these individuals’ 
characters would be characterized together with those who committed less severe acts); and for 
evil acts, judgments of act and character would reconverge.  
THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE EVIL     12 
 
 
Method 
Participants 
 We recruited 80 American participants to take one survey using the online data site 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Samples from Mechanical Turk provide data that are of comparable 
quality to college samples, with the additional benefit of greater diversity in age, race, and 
subclinical psychopathology (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Goodman, Cryder, & 
Cheema, 2012). Participants elected to take the survey and were compensated five cents per 
minute. Of the 80 participants, 3 were excluded from the sample for failing to complete the entire 
survey, leaving 77 participants. The sample was 53% female and had an average age of 33.5 
years.  
Measures 
 In this correlational study, we asked participants to rate both act severity and moral 
character in response to various immoral act scenarios. The specific scenarios are listed in 
Appendix A. Perception of act severity was operationalized as the average self-report response to 
three questions for each immoral act, namely, “How immoral is this action?”; “How severe is 
this action?”; and “How wrong is this action?” Participants used a sliding scale to provide a 
rating between 0-100, with endpoints labeled “Not at all” and “Extremely.” Perception of 
character immorality was similarly operationalized as the average self-report response to three 
questions for each immoral act, namely, “How immoral is this person?”; “How bad is this 
person’s character?”; and “How evil is this person?”  
Procedure 
 Participants read and rated 19 immoral act scenarios (varying in domain and severity) 
two times: once in a block that instructed participants to focus on the act itself, and once in a 
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block that instructed participants to focus on the character of the person performing the act. The 
“act” block only included the questions measuring participants’ perception of act severity, while 
the “character” block included questions measuring participants’ perception of the immorality of 
the person’s character. Both blocks and scenarios were randomly ordered. Finally, participants 
provided their age, gender, and political orientation. 
Results and Discussion 
 Because we are interested in how the relationship between act severity and character 
judgments changes as the severity of an immoral act increases, we analyzed Study 1 data using 
perception of act severity (Severity) as the independent variable and moral character as the 
dependent variable. To account for the variance caused by differences in participants’ overall 
sensitivity to immorality, as well as the unique variance of each scenario, we both nested 
immoral act scenarios within participants and nested participants within immoral act scenarios, 
resulting in a fully cross-classified multilevel model.  
 We built our model using person-centered linear, quadratic, and cubic terms for severity 
and found that the model including the cubic term (Severity3) fit our data significantly better than 
the model without the cubic term, X2(1) = 31.00, p < .0001. (severity refers to the perception of 
the severity of the immoral act scenarios, rather than the character ratings). The final analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of Severity3, t(1383.25)=5.63, p<.001, such that, for act 
scenarios with low severity ratings, character was rated as more immoral than the act itself, while 
for act scenarios with medium to high severity ratings, character was rated as increasingly less 
immoral than the act itself. Finally, for the most severe act scenarios, the perception of act 
severity and perception of character immorality started to re-converge. See Figure 1 below for an 
illustration of this pattern.  
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       Figure 1. The relationship between act severity and character judgments 
 These results suggest that there is a single character perception of moral character as 
“bad” or “immoral” for acts that are mildly to severely immoral, as character ratings exceed act 
ratings for mild scenarios and are lower than act ratings for medium and severe scenarios. 
Finally, the re-convergence of act and character ratings suggests a second, more extreme 
perception of moral character for the very worst scenarios. Although character ratings never 
significantly exceeded act severity ratings as we predicted for mildly immoral acts, these results 
support our first main hypothesis that perception of the immorality of character is more discrete 
than perception of the severity of immoral actions, as well as our second hypothesis that there is 
an evaluation of character as “evil” that is distinct from merely “immoral” or “bad.”  
 In Study 2, we manipulate the severity of immoral acts in an experimental design study, 
rather than simply correlating responses to diverse immoral act scenarios, in order to better 
determine the relationship between the severity of immoral acts and subsequent character 
judgments.  
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Study 2 
In Study 2, we manipulated the severity of immoral actions within 4 domains with 20 
piloted immoral act scenarios and asked participants in one condition to rate the severity of the 
acts and asked participants in another condition to rate the immorality of the person’s character 
in each act. Similarly to Study 1, we predicted that character judgments would be more discrete 
than act judgments, and that there would be a distinct “evil” character categorization.   
Method 
Participants and Design 
 We used 2 (Type of evaluation: Act, Character) x 5 (Severity of act scenario presented: 
Neutral, Mild, Moderate, Harsh, Evil) mixed factorial design study. “Type of evaluation” was 
between subjects while “severity of the act scenario presented” was within-subjects.  
Of the 85 participants, 5 were excluded from the sample for failing the attention check 
and 2 were excluded for not completing the entire survey, leaving 78 participants. The sample 
was 44% female and had an average age of 39.6 years.  
Measures 
In this experiment, we manipulated the severity of various act scenarios and measured 
perception of act severity and perception of character immorality as dependent variables. To 
manipulate act severity, we presented 20 one-sentence immoral act scenarios within 4 different 
immoral act domains, each including 5 levels of severity. The immoral act domains included 
theft, sexual assault, non-sexual violence, and adultery, and ranged in severity from neutral to 
extreme; for example, the neutral theft scenario was “A man shops at a small boutique owned by 
an old woman,” while the extreme theft scenario was “A man steals every item from a small 
boutique owned by an old woman.” We piloted the act scenarios before running the study (N = 
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86) to ensure they increased in severity in an approximately linear fashion. A complete list of act 
scenarios is presented in Appendix B. The Perception of act severity was operationalized as the 
average self-report response to 3 different questions about each act scenario, namely, “How 
immoral is this action?”, “How wrong is this action?”, and “How evil is this action?” Participants 
used a 7-point Likert scale to provide ratings with endpoints labeled “Not at all” and 
“Extremely.” Perception of character immorality was similarly operationalized as the average 
self-report response to 3 different questions about each act scenario, namely, “How immoral is 
this man?”, “How bad is this man’s character?”, and “How evil is this man?” Participants used a 
7-point Likert scale to provide ratings with “Not at all” and “Extremely” as endpoints. 
Procedure 
 Participants read 20 act scenarios, with 5 levels of severity in each of 4 immoral act 
domains. The act scenarios were presented twice, once in a block that instructed participants to 
focus on the act itself, and once in a block that instructed participants to focus on the character of 
the person performing the act. The “act” block only included the questions measuring 
participants’ perception of act severity, while the “character” block included questions measuring 
participants’ perception of the immorality of the person’s character. These 2 blocks were 
randomly assigned between participants such that each participant only viewed the act scenarios 
and answered questions for one of the blocks. Additionally, the order of the act scenarios within 
each block was randomized, and each scenario (along with the 3 questions) was presented on a 
separate page to discourage participants from anchoring from one severity level to another. 
Finally, participants provided their age, gender, and political orientation. 
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Results and Discussion 
 Because we piloted items within to ensure a roughly even distribution of act severity, and 
because the wording of items varied more systematically than in Study 1, we used a repeated-
measures ANOVA rather than a cross-classified multilevel model. Additionally, because the 
model using cubic terms was the best fit for data in Study 1, we conducted a polynomial contrast 
test treating severity as continuous instead of as categorical to further examine the potentially 
cubic shape of the data.  
 Four participants with Cook’s distances >.25 were filtered from the dataset before 
analysis.1 All 4 excluded participants rated the most severe act scenarios as 2.5 or less in 
severity, on average.  Type of evaluation (act vs. character) did not have a significant main 
effect, F(1, 72)=.867, p>.05. Additionally, there was no significant interaction between act 
severity (treating each severity level as a separate category) and type of evaluation, F(4, 
288)=1.781, p = .13. However, the polynomial contrast test revealed the expected cubic 
interaction, F(1, 72)=6.134, p = .02, ηp2 = .08. The effect of Severity3 varies depending on 
whether participants provided Act or Character ratings (see Figure 2).  
                                                
1 A sensitivity analysis including these four outliers reveals that the reported cubic interaction is still significant with 
these outliers included, F(1, 76)=7.70, p=.007, ηp2=.09 
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  Figure 2. The effect of act severity on character judgments 
 The ratings of act severity and immorality of character appear to be the equivalent for all 
levels of severity except “Harsh.” To test this, we ran a pairwise comparison test that revealed a 
significant difference between act and character ratings for severe act scenarios, t(1, 72) = 4.75, p 
= .033, d = .51, such that Character ratings were lower (M = 6.01, SD = .93) than Act ratings (M 
= 5.52, SD = 1.01). No other significant differences between act and character ratings emerged, 
ps > .52. Act severity rating means and standard deviations are included in Appendix B. 
 Although character still follows a strong linear pattern, this study provides evidence that 
judgments of character, compared to judgments of act, are relatively discrete—that is, character 
judgments dissociate from act judgments for Harsh actions, but re-converge for Evil actions. 
This result suggests that people are reluctant to perceive someone’s character as extremely 
immoral until the person in question has committed one of the very worst acts, suggesting a 
distinct “evil” characterization reserved only for specific people. 
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 The next study asks similar questions to Studies 1 and 2 without explicitly instructing 
participants to rate the moral character of the person in each act scenario; rather, we decided to 
explore character as the foundation for how an individual will act in the future, by asking 
participants to predict the likelihood that the individual would perform certain future acts. 
Study 3 
 In Study 3, we used the same 20 piloted act scenarios to manipulate the severity of each 
scenario across 4 different immoral act domains. Each participant read only one of these piloted 
act scenarios. Instead of asking participants to rate the immorality of the person’s character, we 
presented them with 16 different actions (ranging in domain and level of severity) and asked 
them to predict the likelihood that the person would perform each immoral act in the future. As 
in the first two studies, we predicted that participants’ predictions of future acts would follow a 
more discrete pattern, rather than progressing linearly according to the severity of each initial 
scenario. Additionally, we predicted that evil future acts would follow a distinct pattern from the 
future act predictions of other severity levels.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
 
Study 3 was a 2 (Type of evaluation: Act, Character) x 5 (Severity of act scenario 
presented: Neutral, Mild, Moderate, Harsh, Evil) x 4 (Severity of future act predictions: Mild 
Act, Moderate Act, Harsh Act, Evil Act) mixed factorial design study. “Type of evaluation” and 
“Severity of act scenario presented” were between-subjects, whereas “Severity of future act 
predictions” was within-subjects. We recruited 400 American participants to take one survey 
using the online data site Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants elected to take the survey and 
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were compensated $0.33 upon completion. The sample was 49% female and had an average age 
of 38 years. 
Measures 
 In this experimental design study, we manipulated the severity and domain of various 
immoral act scenarios presented to participants and measured the perceived likelihood that the 
subject in each scenario would commit future immoral acts of escalating. We randomly 
presented one of the 20 scenarios used in Study 2. Perceived likelihood of future acts was 
operationalized as the self-report response to a question asking “At some point in the future, how 
likely is it that this man will _______?” about the man in randomly presented scenario. We asked 
about the likelihood of 16 future acts in 4 different immoral act domains, with 4 levels of act 
severity ranging from Mild to Evil. Examples of the future acts include “Hold hands with a 
woman who isn’t his wife” and “Punch someone.” Appendix C contains a list of all future acts 
used in the survey. Participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale with endpoints labeled “Not 
at all” and “Extremely.”  
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants read one randomly 
selected act scenario, followed by 16 questions measuring the perceived future likelihood of the 
various acts described above. The order of the 16 questions was randomized. Finally, participants 
provided their age, gender, and political orientation. 
Results and Discussion 
 We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA rather than a multilevel model to analyze 
Study 3 because we used act scenarios identical to the evenly-distributed piloted scenarios used 
in Study 2. There was a significant main effect of the severity of the initial immoral act scenario 
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presented on ratings of likelihood of future acts, F(4, 384)=65.998, p<.001. Unsurprisingly, there 
was also a significant main within-subjects effect of the severity of future act predictions on 
ratings of likelihood of future acts, F(3, 1152)=394.343, p<.001. Finally, the test revealed a 
significant interaction between severity of future act predictions and the severity of the initially 
presented immoral act scenario on ratings of likelihood of future acts, F(12, 1152)=13.490, 
p<.001.  
 Next, we compared the differences in ratings of likelihood of future acts between 
adjacent levels of future act severity for different severities of initially presented immoral act 
scenarios. Because we ran 30 comparisons, we conducted a Bonferroni corrected pairwise 
comparisons test. Figure 3 below illustrates these comparisons. 
 
 Figure 3. Effect of past act severity on future act predictions. 
 As shown in Figure 3, the difference in ratings of future act likelihood between Harsh and 
Evil future acts is significantly smaller when participants were presented with Evil act scenarios 
(Mdiff = .524, SEdiff = .097), compared to Moderate act scenarios (Mdiff = 1.079, SEdiff = .101), p = 
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.001, and Harsh act scenarios, (Mdiff = 1.192, SEdiff = .100), p < .001; however, this discrepancy 
in the difference between Harsh and Evil acts does not occur when comparing evil initial act 
scenarios to Neutral act scenarios (Mdiff=.391, SEdiff=.100), p=1.00, and Mild act scenarios 
(Mdiff=.658, SEdiff=.101), p=1.00, since those reading Neutral and Mild scenarios reported a 
similarly low future probability of both Harsh and Evil acts. This means that participants tended 
to rate the man in the scenario as more likely to Harsh future acts as act scenario increased in 
severity to Moderate and Harsh, but were relatively reluctant to rate the man as likely to commit 
evil acts unless the man had already done something evil.  
Additionally, the difference in ratings of future act likelihood between Mild and 
Moderate future acts is marginally significantly larger when participants were initially presented 
with Neutral act scenarios (Mdiff=.814, SEdiff=.100) than when participants were initially 
presented with Moderate act scenarios (Mdiff=.433, SEdiff=.100), p=.072, and is significantly 
larger when participants were initially presented with Mild act scenarios (Mdiff=1.043, 
SEdiff=.100) than when participants were initially presented with Moderate act scenarios, p<.001. 
Participants tended to rate the man in the scenario as likely to commit mildly immoral future acts 
across all severity levels of the initial immoral act scenario (including Neutral), but were 
reluctant to rate the man as likely to commit moderately immoral acts unless the man had already 
done something moderately immoral.  
 The overall patterns of Figure 3 show that participants were reluctant to rate the man in 
the scenario as likely to commit all but mildly immoral future acts until he had already done 
something moderately immoral, at which point participants rated the man as likely to commit all 
severity levels of future acts except evil; this trend continues until the man has already 
committed an evil act, at which point the likelihood ratings for the evil act converge with the 
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other future act severities. These results indeed suggest that predictions of future acts are more 
discrete than judgments about the severity of past acts: to the degree that perceptions of 
someone’s moral character correlate with predictions of that person’s future actions, these results 
support our hypothesis that character judgments are more discrete or categorical than perceptions 
of the severity of immoral acts. Additionally, these results support our hypothesis that there is a 
distinct “evil” character judgment reserved for those who commit an evil act.  
General Discussion 
 In three studies, we demonstrated that perceptions of act severity and perceptions of 
character do not have a one-to-one, linear relationship; rather, the studies show that character 
judgments, though they certainly show a strong linear relationship with act severity, are 
relatively more discrete than act judgments. In particular, the studies supported our hypothesis 
that “bad” and “evil” characterizations are distinct from one another. In Study 1, relatively severe 
acts corresponded with less extreme character judgments, until the two ratings began to converge 
for the very worst acts. Similarly, in Study 2, participants rated acts in the Harsh level of severity 
as worse than they rated the character of the person who performed the act, but rated act and 
character the same for scenarios in the Evil and Moderate levels of severity. Studies 1 and 2 
show that people were unwilling to rate the individuals in the scenarios as “almost evil,” even if 
they rated the acts that way; when acts became evil, the character judgments jumped to evil as 
well, suggesting distinct character categorizations for “bad” people and “evil” people. Finally, 
Study 3 suggests that people predict that those who have already committed evil acts in the past 
are especially likely to commit them in the future; almost as likely, in fact, as they are to commit 
less severe acts. 
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Theoretical Implications 
 Our finding that judgments of moral character are more discrete than act severity 
judgments, in particular because of a separate “evil” characterization, provide evidence in 
support of an evolutionary perspective on the importance of impression formation. A heuristic to 
categorize people as bad or evil, rather than use the time and energy to evaluate them on a more 
gradual and/or complex spectrum, would have been adaptive in social contexts in which the swift 
moral condemnation of harmful others increases the likelihood of survival and reproduction. In 
an environment in which resources are scarce and groups are tight-knit, this moral condemnation 
may have served a useful function both within the group, in order to remove group members that 
might weaken group cohesion, as well as outside of the group, in order to eliminate or suppress 
potential outgroup threats. 
 The present research also has implications for assumptions of the stereotype content 
model. According to the original stereotype content model, humans develop impressions of 
individuals and form stereotypes of groups based on dimensions of warmth and competence 
(Cuddy, Fiske, Glick, 2008; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). As noted earlier, recent research 
suggests that morality, while previously seen as a facet of warmth, is actually a distinct third 
dimension that is vital for forming impressions (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacci, & Cherubini, 2011; 
Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2013). Warmth and competence may be viewed as dimensions that 
progress linearly; however, if morality is to be added to the stereotype content model, our 
findings suggest that this third dimension may be more categorical in nature, as stereotype 
content is concerned with the characteristics of individuals, rather than the acts that they perform. 
 While the stereotype content model is concerned with the content of stereotype and 
impression formation, another important factor is how people evaluate other individuals and 
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groups on these dimensions. We stated earlier that moral psychology assumes a relationship 
between act and character, such that actions and behavior inform how one perceives the actor, 
including that individual’s moral character. However, our results suggest that, although there is 
generally a positive correlation between judgments of act severity and moral character, the two 
deviate from each other when act severity is moderate to harsh.  
 Finally, according to the theory of dyadic morality, humans view and judge moral 
situations through the cognitive dyadic template of an immoral agent who inflicts harm upon a 
suffering patient (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). When one part of the dyad is missing (e.g., an 
agent performs an act that is perceived as immoral, but does not cause harm to a clear victim—
e.g., masturbation), dyadic completion takes place to restore the template (such that those who 
perceive masturbation to be immoral will also perceive a victim where one does not exist—e.g., 
children or God; Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014). Because of dyadic completion, if someone who 
is perceived as an immoral agent performs a seemingly wrong act, that act will automatically 
also be perceived as worse than if there was no original judgment about the agent. In theory, one 
might predict that this wrong act would further influence people’s character judgment about the 
agent, resulting in a positive feedback loop in which both the person and their acts are eventually 
perceived as evil, without them ever having committed an evil act. 
However, the discreteness of character judgments may serve to prevent such positive 
feedback loops between act and character. If a person’s character is judged to be moderately 
immoral and they commit a moderately immoral act, then dyadic completion may cause people 
to perceive the act as worse than it already was. But, the current research suggests that character 
judgments are relatively discrete, and that an individual must perform an evil act in order to be 
seen as evil. Because of this, moderate or harsh immoral acts may not influence subsequent 
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character judgments, disrupting the potential feedback loop. In this way, the discreteness of 
character judgments prevents dyadic completion and character perception formation from 
spiraling such that a person is perceived as evil without having first committed an evil act. 
Practical Implications  
 Our findings are relevant for the practice of social and moral psychology research. Moral 
psychology researchers who need to manipulate the moral character of an individual in a vignette 
may do so intuitively by describing an act that the individual has performed and varying its 
severity. However, as seen in our findings, a linear increase in the severity of an immoral act 
does not correspond with a linear increase in the subsequent character judgment that people 
make about the individual who performed the act; specifically, as acts approach severity levels of 
moderate to harsh, character judgments are relatively mild compared to act severity. This 
relationship is important for researchers trying to manipulate perceptions of moral character by 
describing the target’s actions, and may have consequences for research that relies on 
manipulating moral character.  
Limitations 
 In this set of studies, our only method of data collection was online surveys via Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Because of this, we had no control over the environment in which participants 
took the survey or their level of distraction, which may have added noise to the data, though this 
noise should be unsystematic and unlikely to produce false positive results. Additionally, though 
we benefited from greater diversity in age, race, education, and political views by recruiting 
participants through MTurk rather than a college campus (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; 
Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2012), the sample was still demographically homogeneous 
enough to raise questions about the generalizability of our findings across groups and cultures. In 
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particular, cross-cultural research may reveal differences in the relationship between act 
judgments and character judgments. 
 Furthermore, practical implications of our findings rely on the assumption that the 
character judgments a person makes about others affect that person’s subsequent behavior 
toward the people being judged. After all, a discontinuity between judgments of act and character 
would not practically matter if it had no effect on real life decisions and interactions. In the 
current studies, we did not explore the relationship between a person’s character judgments and 
their subsequent behavior, which limits our understanding of the behavioral consequences of our 
findings. 
 A further limitation of Study 1 is that all participants provided both character and act 
judgments for all items. Although the order of these ratings was counterbalanced in the study, 
providing both ratings may have influenced people’s responses by causing them to anchor on 
their first set of reactions to each scenario. However, this limitation is addressed in Study 2, in 
which participants provided only act or character ratings, rather than both. Furthermore, if 
anything, anchoring might actually reduce the possibility that we would observe the current 
pattern of findings in which character ratings are more discrete than ratings of act severity. 
 Finally, our studies explored the relationship between perceived act severity and moral 
character judgments for instances of a single act, when in many cases people know about more 
than just one action a person has committed before judging that person’s moral character. We did 
not examine how performing more than one act of equal severity or performing acts with 
different severities affects subsequent character judgments, or how performing acts of any 
severity can modify an existing perception of moral character. For example, it is possible that 
committing multiple harsh acts, such as hitting someone, leads to the same evil character 
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evaluation that murdering one person does; however, it is also possible that, no matter how many 
times someone performs a harsh act, the perception of their moral character does not cross the 
threshold into evil. Additionally, performing a harsh act followed by a mildly immoral act may 
lead to a softening of the original harsh character judgment, or the mild act could further solidify 
the original harsh character judgment.  Our exploration of single-scenario judgments of act and 
character was an essential starting point, but does not tell the full story of how people judge 
moral character over time. 
Future Directions 
 Many of the current limitations and theoretical gaps can be addressed by further 
exploring the relationship between act severity and character judgments. The natural next step is 
to investigate the effect of making bad or evil character judgments on subsequent behaviors 
toward the target. Additionally, we can address our concerns about the effect of multiple 
immoral actions on character judgments and predictions of future immoral acts. Committing 
multiple immoral acts could reveal that immoral acts have an additive effect, that they are 
averaged together, or that the most severe act is used to make character judgments. Even if 
immoral acts are additive, bounds may still exist; becoming “evil” may require truly evil acts, 
with no exceptions. These questions are important because humans rarely make moral character 
judgments and predictions based on a single previous immoral act without any context or other 
information about the person. 
 Finally, acts and character judgments can also be positive. When individuals read 
immoral act scenarios ranging from neutral to evil, how would they rate the individual’s 
likelihood to perform varying levels of good acts in the future? This question raises a possible 
difference between bad and evil character judgments; bad people may be viewed as capable of 
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committing both good and immoral acts in the future, whereas evil people may be viewed as 
only capable of immoral acts in the future. Put another way, evil may be essentialized, such that 
an evil person must be “pure evil.” 
 Furthermore, good acts and good character may or may not exhibit a similar relationship 
to that between immoral acts and bad character. One possibility is that the same pattern of 
incongruence between act and character judgments may emerge for judgments of virtue as good 
acts approach the extreme end of the positive spectrum, followed by re-convergence for the best 
possible acts. This pattern might make sense if it were as important to identify the most moral 
individuals as it is to identify evil individuals, though identifying good and saintly people may 
not as important from an evolutionary perspective.  
 The final question regarding positive evaluations of character is how people evaluate the 
moral character of those who have only committed neutral acts. While we did present 
participants with neutral act scenarios in Studies 2 and 3, the scale we provided for them to rate 
character on ranged from “Not at all” immoral to “Extremely” immoral; therefore, we would not 
know if participants’ true baseline for evaluating moral character was positive, rather than 
neutral. Past research on the “true self” shows that most people assume others are innately good 
(Newman, Bloom, & Knobe, 2014), suggesting that participants would default to positive rather 
than neutral character ratings when presented with neutral act scenarios. 
Conclusion 
 Judging the moral character of those around us allows us to make sense of our social 
world; moral character judgments not only allow us to attribute a cause to disturbing behaviors, 
but also allow us to predict future behaviors and adjust our own decisions accordingly. The 
present research explored the relationship between perceptions of immoral act severity and 
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perceptions of character immorality of the person who performed the immoral act; we found that 
for more severe acts, character judgments were more discrete than act judgments such that evil 
characterizations are distinct from moderately immoral characterizations. The moral world, for 
all its diversity in acts and outcomes, may be inhabited by a few distinct groups: those who are 
good, those who are bad, and those who are truly evil.  
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Appendix A 
 
A man has sex with a female coworker while his wife is out of town. 
A young woman fails to offer her seat on a full bus to an elderly man. 
A man spends the evening drinking at a bar and drives home. 
A teenager sneaks into a movie theater without paying. 
A woman leaves her dog in a hot car while she gets a haircut. 
A man keeps money accidentally dispensed from an ATM. 
A woman smothers and kills her husband while he sleeps. 
A woman throws trash out of her window while driving.  
A high school boy changes the name on his friend’s paper and turns it in as his own work. 
A 45-year-old man has consensual sex with a 16-year-old girl.  
A man feigns injury to collect insurance money. 
A man sells drugs to a group of middle schoolers.  
A woman eats at a restaurant without leaving a tip. 
A man cancels fishing plans with his neighbor. 
A woman hits her 3-year-old daughter when she misbehaves. 
A 7th grader tells her parents that she hates them. 
A man steals an elderly woman’s wallet. 
A woman takes an elevator up one floor instead of using the stairs. 
A teenage boy steals a pack of gum from a convenience store.  
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Appendix B 
Act severity means and standard deviations are included with each scenario. (M, SD) 
Sexual Assault 
Neutral: A man stands in a subway train next to a woman and listens to music. (1.16, .51) 
Mild: A man stands in a subway train next to a woman and stares at her as he leaves. (1.87, 1.11) 
Moderate: A man stands in a subway train next to a woman and calls her a babe as he leaves. 
(3.04, 1.49) 
Harsh: A man stands in a subway train next to a woman and gropes her ass as he leaves. (6.09, 
1.33) 
Evil: A man stands in a subway train next to a woman and rapes her after everyone else leaves 
the car. (6.74, .87) 
Adultery 
Neutral: A married man high fives a woman from work. (1.34, 1.19) 
Mild: A married man dances with a woman from work. (2.52, 1.71) 
Moderate: A married man holds hands with a woman from work. (3.67, 1.89) 
Harsh: A married man makes out with a woman from work. (5.38, 1.69) 
Evil: A married man sleeps with a woman from work. (5.81, 1.70) 
Violence 
Neutral: A man argues with a woman; after two minutes, he walks away. (1.68, 1.11) 
Mild: A man argues with a woman; after two minutes, he yells and walks away. (2.32, 1.27) 
Moderate: A man argues with a woman; after two minutes, he hits her arm. (5.26, 1.09) 
Harsh: A man argues with a woman; after two minutes, he punches her. (6.39, 1.21) 
Evil: A man argues with a woman; after two minutes, he chokes and kills her. (6.71, .95) 
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Theft 
Neutral: A man shops at a small boutique owned by an old woman. (1.11, .46) 
Mild: A man signs a receipt and accidentally takes a pen from a small boutique owned by an old 
woman. (1.83, 1.12) 
Moderate: A man steals a $5.00 scarf from a small boutique owned by an old woman. (5.26, 
1.33) 
Harsh: A man steals a $300.00 ring from a small boutique owned by an old woman. (6.19, .80) 
Evil: A man steals every item (worth $20,000.00) from a small boutique owned by an old 
woman. (6.65, .66) 
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Appendix C 
At some point in the future, how likely is it that he will… 
Sexual Assault 
Mild: Stare at a woman? 
Moderate: Cat-call a woman? 
Harsh: Grope a woman? 
Evil: Rape a woman? 
Adultery 
Mild: Dance with a woman who isn’t his wife? 
Moderate: Hold hands with a woman who isn’t his wife? 
Harsh: Make out with a woman who isn’t his wife? 
Evil: Sleep with a woman who isn’t his wife? 
Violence 
Mild: Yell at someone? 
Moderate: Hit someone’s arm? 
Harsh: Punch someone? 
Evil: Kill someone? 
Theft 
Mild: Steal $0.50? 
Moderate: Steal $5.00? 
Harsh: Steal $300.00? 
Evil: Steal $20,000.00? 
